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“Profit” and “cost” in electricity have multiple meanings that are shaping the electricity debate. 
This note sets out the meanings and origins of four profit measures referred to: accounting, 
economic, monopoly and Wolak profits.  
In the Figures 1-5 below, the following definitions apply  
• established generation plant are plants in existence and have only running and 
maintenance costs;  
• new generation plant are either under construction or have just been installed: their costs 
include establishment running, maintenance and financing costs; 
• price is the price at which demand equals supply; as in any reasonably (lawyers would 
say workably) competitive market.  
Accounting profits  
Accounting profits arise when financial costs (for the items described above for “new” and 
“established” firms) are subtracted from revenue.   
The established firms have low financial costs, albeit that costs differ between generation types 
(Figure 1).  In a reasonably (workably) competitive market firms face the same electricity price 
as the price required for innovation and new investment in a static or growing electricity industry 
(Figure 2).  It is important that this price be the same for all consumers and generators because 
all their decisions affect the need for new generation. The price indicates the value of substitutes 
for electricity production and consumption. This common price is set by the cost of additional 
electricity production.  
Accounting profits arise in competitive markets as Figure 3 illustrates. They do not of 
themselves indicate a problem of the electricity market, or other markets where they arise. 
Economic Profits 
These are the profits left over after the opportunity costs of all inputs are subtracted from 
revenue. In the example of hydro generation, if water were more valuable in urban or rural uses 
than it is in electricity then hydro generators’ economic profit would be negative. Even though 
Figures 1 to 3 indicate high accounting profit in established hydro generation, negative economic 
profit would imply water should be shifted from electricity to some other use.  
The accounting profit of established hydro plant indicates the value of water to electricity. Stored 
water has an opportunity cost or value that is determined within the electricity industry and 
which determines the optimal use of water and gas by generators. 
Monopoly Profits 
Monopoly profits arise where generators withhold generation and prices rise such that economic 
profits are greater than normal (Figure 4). Greater than normal economic profits arise in markets 
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when there are barriers to entry preventing workable competition. Their presence is indicated 
where the price is generally greater than the price at which investment in efficient new plant is 
viable. 
Accounting profit also increases under monopoly. Firms benefit from accounting profits and 
these too will be higher in the presence of monopoly power. It is accounting profitability that 
provides the incentive for monopoly behaviour. 
Monopoly has the effect of raising prices beyond those prices that are required for new 
investment. New Zealand has an oligopoly of 5 firms, and some small fringe generators. 
Different firms have different cost levels that change with climatic variation suach as the 
location of rainfall. Under these conditions and a nationwide-wide market it is not surprising that 
the market performs as generally competitive. Further, there has been active new plant 
investment and the average spot price and the consequent long-term contract prices have been of 
an order that just supports these investments. Monopoly profits have not been shown to be an 
issue in the New Zealand market to date. 
The Figures 1-4 show that high accounting profit does NOT imply monopoly profit.  
Wolak Profits 
Frank Wolak in his Commerce Commission study of 2009 found no collusion among generators, 
but claimed that there had been monopoly rents of $4.3b over a period of 7 years. His use of the 
term monopoly suggests they correspond closely to firms’ take-home or accounting profits; but 
they do not. The flaws of Wolak’s theory of monopoly in electricity and his empirical work on 
testing for monopoly are set out in a set of papers in the New Zealand Association of 
Economists’ journal New Zealand Economic Papers, 46(1), 2012. Wolak has not responded to 
them.  A key issue with this element of his work is that he does not consider volatility and risk in 
water and gas supplies.  
Wolak profits are shown in Figure 5 below as monopoly rents.   Their problems include: 
a) Wolak costs are neither accounting nor opportunity costs.  
• They are not accounting costs for the calculation of accounting profit because 
Wolak monopoly rents are entirely based upon spot prices, but generators’ revenues 
and customer payments are very largely determined by contract and hedge prices that 
are by design typically very different from the spot price. 
• They are not opportunity costs because they ignore the value of water and measure 
the gas opportunity cost with significant error. 
 
It follows that Wolak profits are neither accounting nor economic profits. 
b) Wolak in his calculation of rents does not give any credit to the spot market’s role in 
allocating scarce water to those most willing and able to manage it in dry years. He finds 
Wolak profits only in dry periods.  
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In his Wolak-profit calculation: 
(i) Wolak assumes that very high prices that last for weeks or months have no effect 
whatever on the amount of electricity demanded. This is demonstrably false. If it 
were true then he would have a point.  
Equivalently: 
(ii) He assumes that there are no dry periods and/or New Zealand has essentially 
unlimited capacity in thermal (gas) generation. These too are false.  
Put another way: 
Wolak does not consider the management and value of water in dry years in his calculations. 
Diana Tam and Lewis Evans (Water is Valuable: the allocation of water and other resources in 
the New Zealand electricity market, forthcoming Monograph, New Zealand Institute for the 
Study of Competition and Regulation, 2013) explain research that shows that one would expect 
to see something very close to Figure 5 in a competitive New Zealand electricity market. The 
heights of the red ‘Market power rents’ bars approximately indicate the value of water in dry 
years. Its high value ekes out stored water and dam inflows over the dry period. 
Summary 
In summary, firms, including monopolists, care about accounting profit.  
Wolak profits do NOT represent accounting profit. His electricity-price pictures are what 
would be expected from the New Zealand system were it operating in a reasonably (workably) 
competitive manner. They accord with normal economic profit.   
Profit in Electricity 
These figures are simplified for presentational purposes 
Figures 1 to 4 show that high accounting profit does not imply monopoly profit. 
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Figure 1: Electricity’s “accounting” cost structure  
 
 
Figure 2: Market demand sets a price at which it just enables investment in new 
generation (assumes static or growing demand).  
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Figure 3: Shaded area is accounting profit arising for established generation 
plant 
  
 
Figure 4: Monopoly profit (dotted) price above the cost of new plant  
 
 
 
 
  
Monopoly price 
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Figure 5: Wolak Profit (taken from Wolak 2009)  
 
 
